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School Violence: An Incurable Social M that Should
Not Lead to the Unconstitutional Compromise of
Students' Rights
INTRODUCTION
Shootings have riddled our schools in recent years. These
shootings have endured despite increased security measures,
increased penalties, and heightened awareness. This situation may
be at the point of becoming a commonplace phenomenon. The
names of the schools, once unknown, now live in infamy.
To recount: on February 2, 1996, fourteen-year-old Barry Loukatis
killed one teacher and two students, and wounded a third student,
at Frontier Junior High School, in Moses Lake, Washington.' Also in
1996, a Scottish man entered a school in Dunblane, Scotland, and
executed sixteen children before taking his own life.2 In February
of 1997, sixteen-year-old Evan Ramsey killed two students and
wounded two others in Bethel, Alaska.3 On October 1, 1997,
sixteen-year-old Luke Woodham stabbed his mother to death and
then proceeded to kill two students and wound seven others at
Pearl High School in Pearl, Mississippi.4 On December 1, 1997,
fourteen-year-old Michael Carneal opened fire at Heath High School
in West Paducah, Kentucky, killing three students and wounding
five others.5 On December 15, 1997, fourteen-year-old Joseph Colt
Todd wounded two students at Stamps High School in Stamps,
Arkansas.6 On March 24, 1998, eleven-year-old Andrew Golden and
thirteen-year-old Mitchell Johnson killed one teacher and four
students, and wounded ten others, in a shooting rampage at,
Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas. 7 On April 25, 1998,
1. John Cloud, Special Report: Troubled Kids, Tim, May 31, 1999, at 34. The weapon
used was a .22 caliber rifle. Id.
2. James 0. Jackson, The Lost Children, TmrE, March 25, 1996, at 14.
3. Richard Lacayo, Toward the Root of the Evil, TIME, April 6, 1997, at 38.
4. Id. The boy used a .30-.30 caliber rifle as his weapon of choice. Id.
5. Daniel Pedersen & Sarah Van Boven, Tragedy in a Small Place, NEWSWEEK,
December 15, 1997, at 30. Carneal used a .22 caliber Ruger pistol, which was stolen from his
neighbor's garage. Id.
6. Richard Lacayo, Toward the Root of the Evil, TIME, April 6, 1998, at 38.
7. Nodya Labi, The Hunter and the Choirboy, TImE, April 6, 1998, at 28. Golden and
618 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 38:617
in Edinboro, Pennsylvania, fourteen-year-old Andrew Wurst killed a
teacher and wounded two other students at a school dance.8 On
May 21, 1998, fifteen-year-old Kipland Kinkel killed two students
and wounded eighteen others at Thurston High School in
Springfield, Oregon.9 On April 20, 1999, eighteen-year-old Eric
Harris and seventeen-year-old Dylan Klebold killed one teacher and
twelve students, and wounded twenty-three others at Columbine
High School in Littleton, Colorado. 10  On May 20, 1999,
fifteen-year-old Thomas Solomon Jr. opened fire at Heritage High
School in Conyers, Georgia, wounding six students.' Finally, on
February 29, 2000, a seven-year-old child shot and killed a
six-year-old girl at Buell Elementary School in Flint, Michigan.' 2
Unfortunately, these latest tragedies are not likely to be the last.
We can expect them to be repeated.13 However, we can also expect
heightened school security, routine searches, and new legislative
"solutions" to be imposed in an attempt to forestall such
occurrences. 14 We can also expect constitutional challenges to
those measures. Existing laws and jurisprudence do not provide a
solution to school shootings; most were enacted in an era when
violence in schools was an isolated phenomenon, concentrated
primarily in urban settings. 5 In contrast, the recent school
Johnson were equipped with a virtual arsenal of weapons, including three rifles and seven
handguns, all stolen from their parents and grandparents. Id. The boys posted themselves in
a sniper position on a small hill above the school before they opened fire on the helpless
students. Id. The students were assembled outside because Golden and Johnson pulled a fire
alarm. Id. According to school procedure, the doors to the school were locked during fire
alarms; the students had no means of finding cover. Id.
8. In re B.R., 732 A.2d 633 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
9. Margot Hornblower, The Boy Who Loved Bombs, TIME, June 1, 1998, at 42. Kinkel
used a .22 caliber semiautomatic rifle and two pistols. Id. The shooting occurred as students
awaited class in a school cafeteria. Id.
10. John Cloud, Special Report: Troubled Kids, TIME, May 31, 1999, at 34. Harris and
Klebold used a handgun, a rifle, and two shotguns. Id.
11. Id. Thomas Solomon used a .22 caliber rifle taken from his home. Id.
12. Randi Goldberg, Boy Shoots Girl in Michigan School,, ASSOCIATED PRESS, February
29, 2000.
13. See Dep't of Educ. & Dep't of Justice, 1998 Annual Report on School Safety (finding
that while school-associated violent deaths have declined, the number of multiple-victim
homicides at schools have increased from two in the 1992-93 school year to six in 1997-98).
14. See Zackie Due, Solehi Beefs Up Security, ALLENToWN MORNING CALL, July 27, 1999,
at B4. (banning all but see through book bags in Southern Lehigh School District, Allentown,
Pennsylvania); Karen McDonald, School Board Bans Book Bags in Lewistown District 97,
PEORIA JOURNAL STAR, August 25, 1999, at B1; (banning all books bags in Lewistown School
District, Peoria, Illinois); Packs Banned from Schoolrooms, PTrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, July 21,
1998, at B3 (banning book bags in classrooms at New Brighton School District, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania).
15. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-105.5 (West 1999) (dealing with possession of
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shootings are difficult to identify or predict, and occur in peaceful,
generally non-urban school environments that experience only rare
and sporadic incidents of violence.
This raises an interesting issue: court decisions upholding
affirmative security measures have dealt with cases where there
existed a school-wide increase in violent behavior.16 However, these
same decisions may not be capable of application in
non-problematic schools. To justify the inevitable enactment of
security measures in these non-problematic schools, the concept of
in loco parentis may have to be rejuvenated in whole or modified
form.17  This would conflict with existing constitutional
jurisprudence.
8
This comment will examine the problem of school violence in
light of three types of measures designed to combat it: (I) Search
and Detection Measures, (II) Social and Moral Measures, and (III)
Deterrence. Search and detection measures are direct, preventative
measures designed to stop violent conduct before it occurs. A
general weapons search of all students entering a school would be
an example of a search and detection measure. Social and moral
measures are indirect, preventative measures designed to appeal to
or manipulate the conscience of students. School violence
programs are an example. Deterrence is also an indirect,
preventative measure because it seeks to deter violent behavior by
imposing harsh penalties on those who violate the law. This
comment will conclude that none of these measures effectively deal
with the school shooting problem. In addition, all three types of
measures may adversely impact established constitutional rights to
the great detriment of school students.
I. SEARCH AND DETECTION MEASURES
As violence continues to rise in schools, searches of students will
deadly weapons on school grounds). School shootings did not become a nationwide problem
until even more recently.
16. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (deciding case in the
context of an alarming increase in drug use). Interesting constitutional issues would seem to
develop where schools with no prior or present history of drugs, violence, or disciplinary
problems institute stringent security measures. Id.
17. See BALLENINE's LAW DICTIONARY 943 (3d ed. 1969), where in loco parentis is
defined as "[olne who has taken a position in reference to a child of that of a lawful
[parent], assuming the office of a [parent] and the obligation of supporting the child,
assuming a parental character and discharging parental duties, although not the parent." Id.
18. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
2000
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likewise increase.19 Searches and seizures are generally governed by
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which
extends to state officials pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 0
However, until recently, the doctrine of in loco parentis prevented
application of the Fourth Amendment to school officials.21 Courts
considered school officials to be private individuals rather than
public officials, reasoning that school officials filled the roles of
parents.22 The United States Supreme Court has discarded this
doctrine, but recent school shootings may prompt a reemergence of
the doctrine of in loco parentis.2 3 At this point, students are
protected by the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.24  Therefore, schools and school officials must
19. But see DEP'T OF EDUC. & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOL SAFETY,
(Oct. 1998) (finding only four percent of schools in 1996-97 performed random metal
detector checks on students and only one percent did so daily).
20. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures). The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment reads in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
21. Jacqueline A. Stefkovich & Judith A. Miller, Law Enforcement Officers in Public
Schools: Student Citizens in Safe Havens?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & LJ. 25, 26.
22. Id. at 26-27.
23. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985) (citing West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). The Supreme Court in TL.O. stated: The Fourth
Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all
the creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate,
and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of
the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 334. TL.O. referred to R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983), for the proposition that state courts were still applying the doctrine of
in loco parentis to defeat challenges to school official search and seizures. Id. at 336. TL.O.
discussed the viability of in loco parentis even though Barnette had seemingly put an end to
the issue nearly twenty years before TL.O. Id.
24. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding
that school students are possessed with First Amendment rights to free speech); TL.O., 469
U.S. at 336-37 (holding that schools can no longer claim that they are immune from following
the Fourth Amendment restrictions on searches and seizures); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977) (holding that students have a right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (holding that students are entitled to
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conduct themselves within the parameters of the Constitution when
employing search and detection measures.
Searches and seizures of students fall into two distinct
categories: (1) individualized suspicion searches, and (2)
administrative searches. An example of an individualized suspicion
search is a search of a student's locker or backpack based on a tip
from another person.25  An administrative search is a search
targeting either a random group of students, a selected group of
students, or the entire student body, without an individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing by any particular student.26  An
administrative search is a blanket search, such as a drug test of all
student athletes .2  Both categories of school searches will be
examined. Throughout this section, this comment will emphasize
that school searches and detection measures should follow the
mandates of the Fourth Amendment as applied by the Supreme
Court in New Jersey v. TL. 0., despite the school shooting problem.
A. Individualized Suspicion Searches
The seminal case on individualized suspicion searches is New
Jersey v. TL.O.28 In TL.O., two students were caught smoking in a
school bathroom. 29 The assistant principal conducted a search of
T.L.O.'s purse and found a pack of cigarettes. 30 Evidence of
marijuana use was also found in the initial search.31 A more
extensive search of the purse produced marijuana.
32
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process upon suspension). However, it should be
noted that some courts have distinguished between the rights of elementary students and
high school students. See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996)
(alluding to the differences between elementary and high school students).
25. See, e.g., S.A. v. Indiana, 654 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
26. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 667. Other examples are the use of a metal detector at a public building or
the use of a checkpoint along a highway. People v. Dukes, 580 N.YS.2d 850, 852 (N.Y Crim.
Ct. 1992).
28. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
29. Id. at 328. Since smoking in bathrooms was against school policy, the two girls
were questioned by the assistant principal. Id. One of the girls admitted that she had been
smoking, but T.L.O. denied that she was smoking and claimed she had never smoked before.
Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The assistant principal discovered cigarette rolling papers which are clearly
associated with the use of marijuana- Id. Even though the assistant principal had already
discovered the cigarettes he was looking for, he proceeded to examine the remaining
contents of the purse. Id.
32. Id. A pipe, plastic bags, a considerable amount of cash, two letters concerning
marijuana dealing, and an index card listing individuals who owed T.L.O. money were found.
2000
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Juvenile proceedings were initiated wherein T.L.O. made a
motion to suppress the evidence seized." The motion was denied
by the juvenile court.34 The juvenile court determined that the
Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches did apply
to searches by school officials but found that, since the assistant
principal had a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. possessed
cigarettes, the search was proper.35 After the appellate division
affirmed the Fourth Amendment ruling, T.L.O. appealed the denial
of the motion to suppress to the New Jersey Supreme Court.36 The
court agreed that school officials were bound by the Fourth
Amendment and that reasonable suspicion was the proper standard
for a search to be lawful.37 However, the court determined that
reasonable suspicion to search the purse was not present.38 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 39
Id. The contraband was turned over to the police, which led to delinquency proceedings and
suspension. Id. at 328-29.
33. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 329.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 330.
37. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 330. The reasonable suspicion standard is generally applied to
state law enforcement officials conducting a Terry search, although probable cause is
required for a general search. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). But with school officials,
TL. 0. signaled a profound difference between school officials and law enforcement officials,
in that school officials could search in all cases only with a reasonable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out, the New Jersey position
represented the majority position of courts at the time. See Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F2d 977
(6th Cir. 1984) (following reasonable suspicion standard); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F2d 1462
(9th Cir. 1984) (utilizing reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause); Horton v. Goose
Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47
(N.D.N.Y 1977) (same); M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-Chatham Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 5,
429 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. M. 1977) (same); In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)
(same); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (same); State v. D.T.W, 425 So.
2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (same); State v. Young, 216 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. 1975) (same);
In re J.A., 406 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. 1980) (same); People v. Ward, 233 N.W.2d 180 (Mich. 1975)
(same); Doe v. State, 540 P.2d 827 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (same); People v. D., 358 N.YS.2d 403
(N.Y. 1974) (same); State v. McKinnon, 558 P.2d 781 (Wash. 1977) (same); In re L.L., 280
N.W.2d 343 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (same). Only a few courts applied the more stringent
probable cause standard to school searches. See State v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317 (La.), vacated,
423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976) (applying probable cause
standard); M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979) (espousing probable cause
standard).
38. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 330-31. The Court found that the possession of cigarettes did not
violate school policy, only smoking in the bathroom was a violation. Id. at 331. Therefore,
the assistant principal conducted an unreasonable search of the purse when his only purpose
was to impeach T.LO.'s statement that she did not smoke. Id. At a minimum, the assistant
principal did not have the authority to conduct a search of the entire purse after finding the
cigarettes. Id.
39. Id. Originally, the Court granted certiorari to decide the narrower issue of what
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The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether the
Fourth Amendment applied to searches and seizures of students by
school officials.40 The State of New Jersey argued that the history
of the Fourth Amendment showed that it applied only to law
enforcement officers, and that the special nature of the relationship
between school officials and school children made the application
of the Fourth Amendment inappropriate. 41 The Court rejected these
arguments, finding that the Fourth Amendment does apply to
searches conducted by school officials.
42
The Court next addressed the applicable standard under the
Fourth Amendment for school searches." New Jersey claimed that
because of the nature of the school environment, any expectation
of privacy on the part of students was illegitimate and
unreasonable." The Court responded by stating that schools have
not yet reached a point where they must be equated with prisons.45
The Court instead balanced the students' reasonable expectations
of privacy against the government's interest in maintaining school
discipline.46 Given the frequency of school violence and drug abuse,
the Court concluded that the need to maintain order and discipline
was a critical concern for schools and therefore school officials
could not be held to the same standard as law enforcement
effect the exclusionary rule would have on evidence presented at delinquency proceedings
when the search was unlawful. Id. The exclusionary rule has been interpreted as an
implication of the Fourth Amendment; in order to deter misconduct of the police, evidence
seized in violation of that Amendment is not admissable. be permitted to be used. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court, however,
subsequently found it necessary to determine the broader question of what limits the Fourth
Amendment places on school officials. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 331.
40. Id. at 333-34.
41. Id. at 334-36.
42. Id. at 336-37. The Court found that school officials no longer act in loco parentis
with regard to school children. Id.
43. Id. at 337. The Court began its analysis by citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967):
The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of
searches requires 'balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails'. . . on one side of the balance are the legitimate expectations of privacy and
personal security;, on the other, the government's need for effective methods to deal
with breaches of public order.
TL.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
44. Id. at 338. New Jersey argued that school children had no need to bring items to
school and therefore had no expectation of privacy in those items. Id. The Court found that
students necessarily must bring items of a private nature to school. Id. at 339.
45. Id. at 338-39.
46. Id.
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officials. 47 The Court determined that the warrant requirement and
the probable cause requirement in the criminal arena were
unworkable in the school setting. 48 Accordingly, the Court adopted
reasonable suspicion as the standard for searches condudted by
school officials and created the following test to determine if that
standard has been met:
[W]hether the search was justified at its inception [by asking
whether] ... there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school [and]
whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place [which is satisfied] when the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of
the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and
sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.
49
Applying this test, the Court found that the search of T.L.O. was
reasonable.50
The reasonable suspicion standard adopted in TL.O. is sensible.
The TL.O. Court recognized the delicate balance between the need
for school order and a student's right to privacy, and emerged with
a compromise. 51 The TL.O. decision may be even more important
47. Id. at 33840.
48. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 340. The Court found that the warrant requirement would unduly
interfere with the maintenance of the school disciplinary system. Id. The Court stated that
probable cause is "not an irreducible requirement of a valid search." Id. Reasonableness of a
search is a fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
49. Id. at 341-42. The Court noted that this test constituted a middle ground,
recognizing both the student's reasonable expectation of privacy and the school's interest in
maintaining order. Id. at 34243.
50. Id. at 347. The Court focused on the initial search for the cigarettes and
determined that the assistant principal had a reasonable suspicion that a search would turn
up cigarettes in the purse.. Id. at 344-45. This evidence was necessary to refute T.LO.'s
statement that she was not smoking in the bathroom. Id. Since the school official was
justified in searching the purse, the rolling papers justified a further search for evidence of
marijuana. Id.
51. Id. In developing this compromise the Court stated:
These school boards have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.
That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes.
Id. at 334 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). See
supra note 39 for the definition of the exclusionary rule.
Vol. 38:617 '
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for the four issues that it did not decide: (1) the application of the
exclusionary rule to unlawful school searches, 2 (2) whether school
students have legitimate expectations of privacy in lockers, desks,
or other school property,3 (3) the standard applicable to searches
conducted in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement
agencies or officials,54 and (4) whether individualized suspicion is
required for all searches.5 5 In addition, the TL.O. decision is nearly
fourteen years old, was decided before the violent outbursts of
school violence, and dealt with drugs rather than weapons. Taking
these factors into consideration, TL.O.'s balancing of interests may
be up for reexamination. The school environment has become so
dangerous and unpredictable that the governmental interest may
now far outweigh any student expectation of privacy.
Since TL.O. was decided, courts have consistently applied the
reasonable suspicion standard to school searches. In In re RE.A.,
the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a search of a student's car on
school premises.56 Following an unproductive search of P.E.A. and
two other individuals suspected of possessing drugs, a school
security officer conducted a search of PE.A.'s car in the school's
parking lot.57 The search turned up a substantial amount of
marijuana.
58
The Colorado Supreme Court applied the TL.O. reasonable
suspicion standard and held that the school officials were justified
in searching the car and also upheld the scope of the search as
"reasonably related to the objectives of the search."59 Even though
52. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 333 n.3.
53. Id. at 337 n.5.
54. Id. at 341 n.7.
55. Id. at 342 n.8.
56. 754 P2d 382 (Colo. 1988).
57. RE.A., 754 P.2d at 384. A police officer was given a tip by a youngster that two
students were planning to sell marijuana at a high school. Id. The police officer immediately
informed the principal of the drug sale. Id. An extensive search was then conducted of the
two individuals which turned up nothing. Id. Upon further investigation, the school officials
learned that one of the individuals rode to school with P.E.A Id.
58. Id. Marijuana and drug paraphernalia were found in the console of the car and a
duffel bag full of marijuana was found in the trunk. Id. After delinquency proceedings were
initiated, the trial court suppressed the evidence because the search failed the TL.O. test. Id.
at 384-85.
59. Id. at 388-90. However, the court articulated the "justified at its inception" language
found in the TL.O. decision differently:
A subjective and unarticulated hunch of criminal activity will not support the
reasonable suspicion standard necessary for an investigatory stop. On the contrary,
the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative stop must be judged against an
objective standard-that is, whether there were specific and articulable facts known
2000
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the court purported to follow the "justified at its inception" test
enunciated in TL.O., it introduced a chain of inferences test; this
test would allow any search as long as each inference could be
connected to a previous inference, not evidence. 60 While in T.L.O.
the inferences were strong and limited in number, the inferences in
PE.A. were weak and numerous.61
Clearly the search of the two individuals in PE.A. would have
been upheld under the TL.O. test based on the reasonable
suspicion created by the tip.62 However, the search of P.E.A. could
not have been conducted with a reasonable belief that the search
would turn up evidence: the school officials were operating
throughout the search based on a mere tip, which alone could not
justify the extensive scope of the search.6 PE.A. was never
mentioned in the tip, and his only connection to the situation was
that he drove one of the two named individuals to school.6 At a
to the officer, which taken together with rational inferences from these facts, created
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the intrusion into the defendant's
personal security.
Id. at 388 (quoting People v. Wells, 676 P2d 698, 701 (Colo. 1984)). The court found that the
tip from the police officer gave the school officials the reasonable suspicion necessary to
search the first of the two students. Id. at 389. Finding no drugs, the school officials were
justified in forming a reasonable suspicion that P.E.A. possessed the drugs because he drove
one of the individuals to school. Id. When no drugs were found on P.E.A., the school
officials could infer that the drugs were in the car:
[Clonsidering the limited ways the students could have transported the marijuana to
school and concealed it on school grounds and the magnitude of the threat of having
the marijuana sold and distributed at the school, . . . the connection between P.E.A.
and EM. establishes the articulated facts and concomitant rational inferences
necessary to create a reasonable suspicion that PE.A. possessed drugs or other
contraband.
Id. The decision in In re RE.A. leaves much to be desired. It seems that the Colorado
Supreme Court has stretched the TL.O. decision to the point of breaking the very
compromise for which that decision stands. The court overemphasizes the governmental
interest in preserving a drug-free school environment while failing to even discuss the
student's legitimate expectations of privacy. See id. at 389-90. The court also cites to a
school policy of searching everyone and everything when reports of drug possession are
introduced. Id. at 384, 386 n. 5. The court states that other friends, besides PE.A., would
also have been searched according to this policy. Id. at 386 n.5.
60. RE.A., 754 P.2d at 388.
61. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In TL.O., the assistant principal had
an eyewitness, a teacher, who saw T.LO. smoking. Id. at 328. This led the principal to
believe T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse. Id. Examination of the purse revealed evidence of
marijuana use. Id. In RE.A., the only evidence acquired in the interim between the tip and
the search of the car was that no other evidence was found. RE.A., 754 P.2d at 384. This is
not a link at all.
62. RE.A., 754 P.2d at 384.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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minimum, the search should have been discontinued when, after
the search of PE.A., no evidence was found. When the school
officials searched the car, they clearly exceeded the scope of a
reasonable search. The Colorado Supreme Court ignored the
balancing test in TL. 0., which should be applied to each individual
search conducted, not to the entire series of searches as a whole. It
evaded the issue of reasonable expectations of privacy by linking
the search of the car to the search conducted in the school.
65
Courts should measure the legitimate expectations of privacy on
a rational continuum, with the expectation of privacy inside the
school being given less weight than the expectation of privacy in
one's vehicle. 66 Otherwise, in applying the "articulated facts" test set
forth in RE.A., school officials could inferentially justify a search of
a student's home and bedroom.6 After the student searches proved
fruitless, the school officials should have turned over their
suspicions to a law enforcement agency, who are required to
secure a warrant for the additional search of the car.6s
In another case dealing with an individualized suspicion search,
Martens v. District No. 220, Board of Education, a federal district
court upheld the search of a student's pockets.69 An anonymous
phone tip informed the dean of students that Martens had sold
marijuana in the school. 0 Martens was brought to the principal's
office and held forty-five minutes for questioning.7" A police officer,
at the school on other business, convinced Martens to empty his
pockets whereby a pipe with marijuana residue was discovered.72
Applying the TL.O. test, the court found reasonable suspicion,
based on the anonymous phone tip and the substantial drug
problem faced by the school.73
In Cason v. Cook, the Eighth Circuit confronted a suit brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and upheld the search of a student's purse
and a pat-down search under the TL.O. test.74 The student was
65. See id. at 389.
66. See In Re S.C., 583 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 1991) (finding expectation of privacy in locker
is less than in home or automobile).
67. RE.A., 754 P2d at 388.
68. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding police to the warrant
requirement when conducting a search). However, the school officials may have been
justified in refusing access to the vehicle until police arrived.
69. 620 F Supp. 29 (N.D. IlM. 1985).
70. Martens, 620 F Supp. at 30.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 31.
73. Id. at 32.
74. 810 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1987). Section 1983 is a federal civil rights provision, allowing
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implicated in the theft of certain items by several students who
informed school officials that the student was in the locker room
where the items had been stolen.7 5 The court found that the school
officials had a reasonable suspicion that the student was involved
in the thefts and, therefore, the search of her purse was justified.76
Furthermore, the pat-down search was also deemed reasonable
given the incriminating evidence found in the purse.
77
1. Searches Involving Law Enforcement Officials
A critical question involves the applicable standard to searches of
students when the searches involve law enforcement officials.
These searches can be organized into three types: (1) searches
conducted by law enforcement officers at the request of school
officials; (2) searches conducted by school officials at the request
of law enforcement officers; and (3) searches conducted by school
officials in the presence of law enforcement officers.7 8 It should be
noted that the mere presence of law enforcement officers may
permit arguments that the higher standard of probable cause
should attach. If so, the heightened standard of probable cause
could mean the difference between an unlawful search and a legal,
reasonable search. This issue has yet to be resolved by the United
States Supreme Court.79
In RE.A., a police officer acted as a tipster, but was merely
present as the searches were conducted.80 The Colorado Supreme
Court rejected the argument that a probable cause standard should
apply due to the police officer's presence, and instead determined
that the crucial question is whether school officials are acting as
agents of the police in conducting the search.81 Agency must be
citizens to maintain civil actions against state officials for egregious acts or abuse of power.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
75. Cason, 810 F2d at 190. A rash of thefts in the locker room prompted an
investigation by the principal. Id. at 189-90. A list of four students seen in the locker room
was established. Id. at 190. Cason's purse was searched, which produced a stolen coin purse.
Id. A pat-down search followed. Id.
76. Id. at 193.
77. Id.
78. See People v. Overton, 249 N.E.2d 366 (N.Y 1969) (illustrating police requested
searches); People v. Alexander B., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (illustrating
school official requested searches); State v. P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1988) (illustrating
mere presence of police officer).
79. But cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985) (expressly declining to
address the issue).
80. PE.A., 754 P2d at 384.
81. Id. at 385. The trial court found that the police officer instigated the investigation
by providing information that certain students were in possession of drugs. Id. Even the
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determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, and the
burden is on the defendant to show that the school official acted as
an agent of the police.8 2 The RE.A. court held that if the school
officials are not acting as agents of the police, the proper standard
for determining the legality of the search is the reasonable
suspicion standard.83 The bottom line is that dissemination of
information by police and their presence at searches conducted by
school officials does not necessitate application of the probable
cause standard, absent some evidence of agency 4
A search by a police officer at the request of a school official is
likewise resolved under the reasonable suspicion standard, as
illustrated by In re Alexander B.8 5 In that case, a school official
requested that a nearby police officer search a group of gang
members after the official was provided with information that one
of the gang members had a weapon.86 The court found the
heightened standard of probable cause was not required.87 A federal
district court has similarly upheld as reasonable a search under the
reasonable suspicion standard where a law enforcement officer
asked a student to empty his pockets after advising him that it was
best to cooperate. 88
Searches conducted by or in the presence of law enforcement
Supreme Court of Colorado agreed that the officer would not have had probable cause to
search the students himself. Id. at 384. The trial court found this case involved a mere
subterfuge by police officials to obtain evidence under a more lenient standard. Id. at 385.
82. Id. The court noted that the principles applying to searches conducted by police
officers applies equally to searches conducted by school officials acting as agents of the
police. Id.
83. Id. at 386.
84. Id. The search in RE.A. was ruled independent of law enforcement officer control
or direction. Id. at 385-86. Despite misgivings as to PE.A. as a whole, the decision regarding
police official searches seems to be in accord with precedent and is sensible.
85. 220 Cal. App. 3d 1572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
86. In re Alexander B., 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1576. A potentially volatile situation
confronted the dean of students when three gangs began taunting each other and
information was presented that one of the gang members had a weapon. Id.
87. Id. at 1577.
88. Martens v. District No. 220, Bd. of Educ., 620 F Supp. 29 (N.D. Ill. 1985). The
district court reasoned that the search was properly examined under a reasonable suspicion
standard since the officer had nothing to do with the development of the facts that prompted
the investigation and did not order the detention of the student. Id. at 32. Even though the
officer prompted the emptying of the pockets, the court concluded that "there is no
indication that a criminal investigation was contemplated, that this was a cooperative effort
with law enforcement, or that but for his intervention [the studeit] would not have been
searched eventually." Id. This decision was probably wrong in that it assumes too much and
gives too little regard to the role the police officer actually played in the search itself and its
prompting.
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officials merit close consideration as more and more police are
assigned to active roles in schools. Courts should proceed with
heightened caution, conducting a closer examination when law
enforcement officials are in any manner involved in school
searches. A suggested procedure for courts when police are
involved in a student search is as follows.
The first question to ask is whether the police were "involved",
meaning what did they actually do. Presence would seem to satisfy
this first inquiry if the police were standing guard or in a position
of authority. Second, a court should ask what the apparent purpose
of the search was. If the apparent purpose was to further the
school's interest in maintaining order and discipline, any evidence
acquired pursuant to such conduct should be admissible in any
subsequent prosecution. This certainly would be in line with TL. 0.,
which rests its decision on the strong governmental interest in
maintaining order and discipline in schools. Police officers should
be available as an instrument to further that interest; however, they
should not be able to gather incriminating evidence under a lesser
standard just because they are in a school.89 Where the apparent
purpose of the search is evidentiary, the court should consider the
type of proceeding in which the evidence is to be used. If it is a
criminal proceeding, the probable cause standard should be
applied.90 If the proceeding is to determine suspension or
expulsion, then the evidence should not be excluded so long as
school officials would have possessed reasonable suspicion had
they conducted the search rather than the police.
2. Locker Searches
Another issue is presented when a student's locker is searched. 91
Schools argue that lockers, desks, and other such areas are school
property for which students cannot have a legitimate expectation of
privacy.92 On the other hand, students expect some element of
89. See Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (terming the allowance of such a situation as
the silver platter doctrine).
90. See Jacqueline A. Stefkovich & Judith A Miller, Law Enforcement Officers in
Public Schools: Student Citizens in Safe Havens?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & LJ. 25, 68. (espousing
a similar rationale, except they would exclude evidence seized in all instances where
evidence was used in criminal proceedings regardless of purpose).
91. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 n.5 (1985). The Court stated, "[w]e do
not address the question, not presented by this case, whether a schoolchild has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in lockers, desks, or other school property provided for the storage of
school supplies." Id.
92. Id. See U. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.3 (West Supp. 1998) (providing that all desks
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privacy in those areas, as evidenced by the fact that the items
school officials are most interested in finding are usually located in
student lockers.93 Backpacks, purses, and other items of storage
placed in student lockers pose a different problem; generally, these
items would carry all the protections of the Fourth Amendment if
carried outside of lockers.94 But these protections are seemingly
thwarted when school officials claim that the placement of these
items in school owned lockers strips the students of a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
In People v. Overton, police conducted a search of two student
lockers.9 5 Marijuana was found inside of a jacket in one of the
lockers.9 6 The court determined that the vice-principal consented to
the locker search, and this consent was binding on the students
because the school retained control over the lockers.97 The court
stated, "each student had exclusive possession of the locker only
vis-a-vis other students. . . '[niot only have the school authorities a
right to inspect but this right becomes a duty when suspicion
arises that something of an illegal nature may be secreted there.'"98
The New York Court of Appeals held that the locker search was
permissible.99 The Overton decision stands as the quintessential
case that construed lockers as school property, concluding that
students possess no expectation of privacy in their lockers.
However, the applicability of the ultimate holding in Overton may
be limited because law enforcement officials instigated the search.
In S.A. v. State, school officials searched a student's locker and
book bag.1°° The Indiana Appellate Court determined that student
and lockers within school building are property of the school and can be searched at any
time); OKiA STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-102 (West 1997) (providing school may search lockers);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.210, 220 (West 1997) (providing school may search lockers).
93. See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992) (considering
exclusion of drugs found in locker).
94. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A-2d 350, 368-69 (Pa. 1998) (Zappala, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that items do not lose protection by placing items in lockers).
95. 301 N.YS.2d 479 (N.Y 1969). The three police detectives were acting pursuant to
an invalid warrant calling for a search of the students and their lockers. Id. at 480.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 367. The court found that the lockers were assigned to students at the
beginning of the school year and the students were given locks with combinations; however,
the students were required to disclose the combination to their teacher. Id.
98. Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari,
vacated, and remanded the case for reconsideration, following its decision in Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). Overton v. New York, 393 U.S. 85 (1968).
99. Overton, 249 N.E.2d at 368. The court refused to extend Bumper to the school
setting. Id.
100. 654 N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). The search followed several locker
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lockers were the property of the school, and therefore students had
no reasonable expectation of privacy at all in either the locker or
its contents.' 10 The court based its decision on Indiana law and a
school policy set forth in student handbooks. 10 2 This makes S.A.
distinguishable from the pure school property approach in Overton,
where no school policy was articulated. The court in S.A. did not
answer whether the holding would differ had there been no such
policy.
There are also cases in which courts have held that students do
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their lockers, for
example Commonwealth v. Snyder.0 3 After an examination of
relevant case law in other jurisdictions, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held in Snyder that "each student ha[s] the right not to have
his/her locker subjected to unreasonable search."1°4 The court
found that Snyder could properly argue constitutional violations
under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article Fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights, but determined that the search was reasonable under
federal law and that probable cause was present under state law.
10 5
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Mississippi in In re S.C. held
that students have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
lockers. 10 6 The court determined that the search by school officials
of a student's locker did not comport with Mississippi's
Constitution, which contemplates a reasonable expectation of
break-ins and the theft of the school's locker combination book. Id.
101. Id. at 795.
102. Id. Indiana law at the time of the decision declared that school lockers were the
property of the school and were not the subject of students' reasonable expectations of
privacy. See IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5-17 (1988).
103. 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992).
104. Id. at 1366. (citing State v. Engerud, 463 A.2d 934 (N.J. 1983); State v. Michael G.,
748 P.2d 17 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); In re Dumas, 515 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); State v.
Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985)).
105. Id. at 1367-68. In Snyder, school officials were given a tip from a teacher that
Snyder was attempting to sell marijuana in the school, and that the marijuana was in his
book bag. Id. at 1364. The school officials located Snyder, but the book bag containing the
marijuana was not in his possession. Id. at 1365. The school officials decided to search the
locker instead of approaching Snyder. Id. The trial court decided that the student had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker. Id. Additionally, the motion judge decided
that school officials had reasonable suspicion to conduct the search. Id.
106. 583 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 1991). S.C. attempted to sell two handguns to a student, who
reported this information to the school's assistant principal. Id. at 189. The assistant
principal asked the student to ask S.C. whether he had the guns at the school. Id. The court
announced the rule that "absent information that a particular student informant may be
untrustworthy, school officials may ordinarily accept at face value the information they
supply." Id. at 192.
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privacy in lockers. 10 7 Nevertheless, the court recognized that this
expectation of privacy is much lower than the expectation of
privacy in one's home or automobile.108 The court found that in this
case reasonable suspicion was present under the federal standard
and, although the student had a reasonable expectation of privacy
under state constitutional principles, the search was reasonable.' 9
Faced with the same situation, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
in Commonwealth v. Carey determined that the crucial question is
whether a school policy exists regarding lockers.110 Citing an
analogous situation, the court stated, "while public employees have
reasonable expectation[s] of privacy in their offices, desks, and file
cabinets, these expectations may be reduced by virtue of actual
office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation."' The
court also noted that, "if the school authorities have made it clear
that possession of the locker is 'nonexclusive against the school
and its officials' . . . the advance notice provides the student with
an opportunity to limit the effect of the intrusion by not keeping
highly personal materials in the locker provided by the school.""1
2
The Carey decision may be well grounded in logic, but there is a
potential for abuse. First, school officials can carry this logic
beyond the locker context and adopt policies for body searches
and backpack searches, claiming that students have no reasonable
expectation of privacy because school policies give students
advance notice of the likelihood of a search. For this reason, Carey
should be limited to school lockers and should not be extended to
other situations, such as persons, automobiles in school parking
lots, student desks, or student book bags. Second, the publication
of a search policy in a student handbook should not provide a
107. Id. at 191. The Mississippi constitutional provision reads, "The people shall be
secure in their persons, houses, and possessions, from unreasonable seizure or search; and
no warrant shall be issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
specially designating the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." Miss.
CONsT. art. I1I, § 23.
108. In re S.C., 583 So. 2d at 191-92.
109. Id. at 191-93. The court did not elaborate on why reasonable suspicion was met,
but simply stated that in comparing T.L.O. to the facts of this case that standard was
satisfied. Id. at 191.
110. 554 N.E.2d 1199 (Mass. 1990). The school officials conducted a search of the
student's locker following reports that the student had brought a sawed-off rifle to school in
order to settle a recent altercation. Id. at 1200.
111. Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987)).
112. Id. at 1202 (quoting 4 W.R. Lafave, Search and Seizure § 10.11 (b), at 177 (2d ed.
1987)). The court decided not to venture into a decision on this issue because reasonable
suspicion was present under the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by TL.O. Id.
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basis for actual notice. In reality, students rarely read student
handbooks, and of those who do, many do not understand the
policies discussed. Oral notice should supplement written policies
to inform students that they have no expectation of privacy in their
lockers. Third, students should not lose privacy rights in regard to
book bags and other enclosed items stored in lockers. Generally,
these items carry a separate reasonable expectation of privacy and
require application of a reasonable suspicion standard to be
searched."' This reasonable suspicion standard should not be shed
by the storage of those items in a student locker.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court followed this logic in In re
Dumas, stating, "we are unable to conclude that a student would
have an expectation of privacy in a purse or jacket which the
student takes to school but would lose that expectation of privacy
merely by placing the purse or jacket in [a] school locker provided
to the student for storage of personal items."114 The Pennsylvania
court held that a student does have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his or her locker, and that the reasonable suspicion
standard must be applied.1 5 It is clear that the presence or absence
113. See WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28A-600.240 (West 1997) (segregating locker searches
in general from searches of containers therein and requiring a reasonable suspicion for a
search of those containers).
114. 515 A.2d 984, 985 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). In Dumas, a teacher saw Dumas getting
cigarettes from his locker and giving cigarettes to other students. Id. at 985. The school's
assistant principal found cigarettes on Dumas and then searched the locker and a jacket
therein. Id. The search produced marijuana from the inside of the jacket. Id.
115. Id. at 986. Under the reasonable suspicion standard, the court determined that the
assistant principal had exceeded the scope of his initial justified search by searching the
locker. Id. In light of the fact that he had already found a pack of cigarettes on Dumas, the
assistant principal did not have a reasonable basis to believe that a search of the locker
would produce additional cigarettes. Id. Judge Kelly's concurring opinion in Dumas is
especially informative; Judge Kelly found that the absence of a uniform policy or consistent
practice regarding locker searches justified the majority's conclusions. Id. at 986-87 (Kelly, J.,
concurring). Judge Kelly emphasized that
although students may in fact store a variety of personal items in their lockers, they
do so by license and not by right. If the student is notified that he or she is provided
with a locker which is subject to inspection or search, there would be no reasonable
expectation of privacy. A student would then have the choice of using the locker
subject to its conditions, or not using it. I find no constitutional entitlement to a
school locker.
Id. at 987 (Kelly, J., concurring). Kelly relied on a Kansas Supreme Court decision stating
that
although a student may have control of his locker as against fellow students, his
possession is not exclusive against the school and its officials. A school does not
supply its students with lockers for their illicit use in harboring pilfered property or
harmful substances. We deem it a proper function of school authorities to inspect
lockers under their control and to prevent their use in illicit ways for illegal purposes.
2000 School Violence: An Incurable Social Ill 635
of a policy should be the key inquiry when faced with a locker
search problem.
16
3. School Security Officers
Another issue in individualized suspicion searches concerns
school security officers and law enforcement officers assigned to
schools for safety reasons."7 A determination as to whether officers
are considered police or school officials mandates the standard to
be applied under the Fourth Amendment. Generally, police officers
assigned to schools are held to the sane probable cause standard
that they are held to on the streets. 18 However, when acting akin
to school officials in a security capacity, police and security
officers are usually held to the same lowered standard as school
officials." 9
An early case, People v. Bowers, held a school security officer to
the probable cause standard. 20 In Bowers, a school security officer
detained a student who matched the description of a student who
had stolen a watch.'2 ' The owner of the watch could not identify
the detained student as the thief.122 The security officer then
noticed a bulge and a manila envelope in the boy's pants and
Id. at 988 (Kelly, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Stein, 456 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1969)). The
concurring opinion quoted the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Engerud, ("had the
school carried out a policy of regularly inspecting students' lockers, an expectation of
privacy may not have arisen") and the Tnth Circuit in Zamora v. Pomeroy, ("inasmuch as
the school had assumed joint control of the locker it cannot be successfully maintained that
the school did not have a right to inspect it"). Id. at 988 (Kelly, J., concurring) (citing State v.
Engerud, 463 A.2d 934 (N.J. 1983) and Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 E2d 662 (10th Cir. 1981)).
116. But see Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1998) (determining by
implication that an articulated policy concerning locker searches did not prevent an inquiry
into the reasonableness of the search). In Cass, the school set forth a policy in handbooks
stating that student lockers were subject to searches at any time without warning. Id. at 356.
School officials then conducted a massive search of student lockers. Id. at 352.
117. See, e.g., PA. STAT.ANN. tit. 24, § 7-778 (West 1992) (providing for appointment of
law enforcement officers to schools upon petition to court). See also U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. &
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOL SAFETY (Oct. 1998) (finding six percent
of schools station law enforcement officers in their schools for at least 30 hours a week).
118. Mary Pat Daviet, Police Officers in Public Schools: What are the Rules?, 27 CowO.
LAw. 79 (Nov. 1998).
119. See S.A. v. State, 654 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a search by
police officer was to be analyzed under the TL.O. test, because the police officer was acting
in capacity as a security officer for the school).
120. People v. Bowers, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
121. Bowers, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 433. The dean of students supplied the security officer
with the information and the description of the student. Id. The security officer believed the
student was the thief because of the coat he was wearing. Id.
122. Id.
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ordered the boy to empty his pockets; marijuana was found.123 The
court, in making its determination, emphasized the critical
distinction between a school official and a security officer:
As a general rule, a teacher, to a limited extent at least, stands
in loco parentis to pupils under his charge. As such, the courts
have held that it would not be "unreasonable or unwarranted
that he . . . be permitted to search -the person of a student
where the school official has reasonable suspicion that
[contraband] may be found on the person of his juvenile
charge " . . . . Not only have the school authorities the right to
inspect but this right becomes a duty when suspicion arises
that something of an illegal nature may be secreted there.124
Because the school security officers were under the
authority of the police commissioner and had equivalent law
enforcement powers, the security officer was viewed as a
police officer and not as a school official, and thus the more
stringent standard of probable cause applied to the search. 125
The Bowers decision probably goes too far in holding all law
enforcement officers to a probable cause standard. If safety is
the underlying purpose behind searches, the evidence should
not be suppressed in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
However, if the purpose of the search is to seize and secure
123. Id.
124. Id. at 434 (internal citations and emphasis omitted). The vice principal here had
an obligation to conduct the search in question. Id. The court noted:
A school official, standing in loco parentis to the children entrusted to his care, has
inter alia, the long honored obligation to protect them while in his charge, so far as
possible, from harmful and dangerous influences, which certainly encompasses the
bringing to school by one of them of narcotics and "works", whether for sale to other
students or for administering such to himself or other students.
Id. at 434-35 (internal citation and emphasis omitted). This implication is currently uncertain
given the rejection of the in loco parentis doctrine. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985).
125. Bowers, 356 N.YS.2d at 435. The court considered that the security officer was
paid by the school district, but noted, "[iut is clear that the security officer is, at least, a
governmental agent clothed with the authority of a peace officer and ultimately responsible
to the Police Commissioner. He was placed in the school solely for security purposes and
served no educational function." Id. "It is worth noting, that in the [Brown] case, the security
officer, although he did not wear a uniform nor possess a badge, was still required to act
only on probable cause." Id. In Brown, the court stated: "[ilt is, in fact, cynical to hold that
the Fourth Amendment protections apply to searches by police officers but not to other
agents of the City who are required to perform like governmental functions and clothed with
the color of authority to make arrests." Id. Therefore, "[t]he government may not appoint
agents to perform governmental functions, as here, and at the same time claim that they are
immune from constitutional restrictions placed upon governmental authority." Id.
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evidence, then the evidence should be suppressed if it does
not satisfy the probable cause standard.
Modem cases do not 'consider security officers equivalent to
law enforcement officials. In State v. Serna, school security
officers seized cocaine from a student involved in an
altercation off-campus. 2 6  The court determined that the
security officers must be considered state actors because they
were employed and acted as agents of the school district.'27
The court then extended the school's interest in protecting
student safety from on-campus activity to include travel back
and forth from school. 128 The court applied the reasonable
suspicion standard and held that the search was reasonable. 129
A word of caution should accompany the Serna case. Courts
should be highly skeptical when law enforcement officers are
pursuing searches beyond school grounds in the name of
school safety.30 Courts should also recognize that school
security guards have no authority to conduct searches outside
the jurisdiction of the school grounds unless they are police
officers.
B. Administrative Searches
The United States Supreme Court case of Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton is the primary case in the area of
126. 860 P2d 1320, 1322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). Students from a school were involved in
a stick and rock fight outside of school grounds. Id. The security staff at the high school
was instructed by the school principal to break up the fight and bring the students to school.
Id. The chief of security asked Serna to give him school identification. Id. As the student
pulled out the identification, he also pulled out a plastic baggie. Id. The chief ordered that
the student turn over the plastic baggie, which contained cocaine. Id.
127. Id. at 1323.
128. Id. at 1323-24. This indicates a major extension, perhaps an unwarranted one, of
the TL.O. test to searches of students off school premises. The incident and subsequent
search in this case occurred approximately two blocks from the school. Id. Even assuming a
reasonable suspicion standard is warranted, the security officials here failed that test. After
finding no weapons in Serna's pockets, the security officer had nothing more than a hunch
that the plastic baggie would contain drugs. Id. The court should have found that the school
interest in maintaining order and discipline dissipated when no weapons were found and any
further search constituted an evidentiary search.
129. Id. at 1324-26. Applying the test, the court found that the search was justified at
its inception, because of the proximity of the student to the fight, because weapons were
involved, and because Serna was coming out of the bushes. Id. at 1325. Serna argued that
the search exceeded its permissible scope when the security officers began to focus their
search towards drugs and not weapons. Id. The court did not agree. Id.
130. See Serna, 860 P2d at 1323-24.
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administrative searches. 31 All searches that do not have an element
of individualized suspicion and involve more than one student, such
as metal detector searches or checkpoint searches, should be
analyzed under the rationale of Acton.
In Acton, the school district faced a sudden increase in the
occurrence of violence, drug use, disciplinary problems, and
profanity, especially with athletes. 132  In response, the school
enacted a policy to test all student athletes for drug use at the
beginning of each sports season.13 Ten percent of student athletes
were then randomly pooled and selected for testing.'TM Acton was
denied the opportunity to participate in football after he refused to
consent to drug testing. '
The Supreme Court noted, "state-compelled collection and testing
of urine . . . constitutes a 'search' subject to the demands of the
Fourth Amendment."136 The Court concluded that "'the Fourth
Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of [individualized]
suspicion.' . . . We have upheld suspicionless searches and seizures
to conduct drug testing of railroad personnel involved in train
accidents."137
The Court first examined the traditional theory of in loco
131. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
132. Acton, 515 U.S. at 649. Student athletes were the perennial heads of the school's
drug culture. Id. Athletes began suffering injuries and lapses of judgment during
performance. Id. Informative procedures and canine patrols did not solve the problem. Id.
133. Id. at 650. Students who wanted to participate in sports had to complete a
consent form signed by themselves and their parents. Id.
134. Id. When students were tested, they were asked to provide information regarding
prescription medication they were on. Id. Students provided a urine sample at a locker room
urinal with only a monitor in the room. Id. The monitors generally listened instead of
supervising the students, and the girls produced the sample in an enclosed bathroom stall.
Id. The samples were then sent to an independent laboratory for testing. Id. Test results
were made available to school officials only. Id. at 651. A positive testing necessitated a
second test to confirm the test results. Id. Students are then given the choice of entering a
six week program with weekly testing, or suffering suspension from sports for two seasons.
Id.
135. Id. Acton then filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming a violation
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 651-52. The district court dismissed the
action but was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 652. The Supreme Court of the United
States accepted the case via certiorari and delivered an opinion written by Justice Scalia- Id.
136. Acton, 515 U.S. at 652 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602 (1989)). Although Skinner dealt with railroad employees rather than school students, the
Court noted that the special interests and unique nature of the school environment
necessitates a lowering of the usual standards applicable to searches and seizures. Id. at 653
(citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)).
137. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653 (citations omitted). This analysis is, of course, limited by a
standard of reasonableness; only expectations of privacy that society is willing to recognize
as legitimate are considered. Id. at 654.
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parentis, where schools assumed the role of parent to supervise
children.'-" The Court determined that while schoolchildren do not
shed their rights upon entering the schools, those rights are not as
developed as the rights possessed by adults. 39 The Court held that
the students' limited expectations of privacy are even lower with
student athletes, given the "element of communal undress" inherent
in the locker room environment and the voluntary submission to
athletic regulations.' 4°
The Court also examined the character of the intrusion and
noted that, although collecting urine samples intrudes upon an
excretory function traditionally protected, the critical examination
should be of the method used to obtain the sample.'4' The Court
found the method employed in this case was minimally intrusive at
best.142 Finally, the Court looked into the nature and the immediacy
of the governmental concern, and the efficacy of the means
employed. 14 The Court rejected the argument that a compelling
interest was required for the testing, and found that a court must
ask whether there is "an interest that appears important enough to
justify the particular search at hand in light of other factors that
show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine
expectation of privacy."144 The Court determined that the deterrence
of drug use among school students is as important as stopping the
illegal importation of drugs or drug use in general. 45  The
immediacy of the situation, given the widespread use of drugs in
the school, supported the importance of the interest. 46 The efficacy
138. Id. at 654-55.
139. Id. at 655-56. Scalia cites various routine procedures which students are forced to
submit to, such as physical examinations and vaccinations. Id. at 656.
140. Id. at 657. The Court indicated that voluntary participation necessarily equates
with some intrusion upon individual liberties and privacy. Id.
141. Id. at 658.
S142. Acton, 515 U.S. at 658-60. The Court also noted that the disclosure aspect of the
test was conducted with minimal intrusion on individual liberties and privacy, but went on to
indicate that under certain circumstances the test could be significantly intrusive. Id.
143. Id. at 660.
144. Id. at 661 (emphasis omitted). The district court read Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
and Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) as requiring a "compelling
interest." Acton, 515 U.S. at 660-61.
145. Acton, 515 U.S. at 661. -
146. Id. at 662-63. The Court noted,
[T]he District Court's conclusion that a large segment of the student body particularly
those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion, that disciplinary
actions had reached epidemic proportions, and that the rebellion was being fueled by
alcohol and drug abuse as well as by the student's misperceptions about the drug
culture. That is an immediate crisis of greater proportions than existed in Skinner.
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of the means employed was also deemed practical. 147 The Court
rejected an argument that the means employed must be the least
intrusive practicable. 148 It noted that an individualized suspicion
method would place a tremendous strain on teachers to identify
and prosecute drug use, a function "for which they are ill prepared,
and which is not readily compatible with their vocation."149 Thus,
the Court upheld the random drug testing policy as reasonable.'5
In summary, when faced with a search conducted without
individualized suspicion and conducted generally against a segment
of, or the entire, student body, a court must .balance three distinct
factors enunciated in Acton: (1) the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the search intrudes, keeping in mind that only
reasonable expectations of privacy should be considered, and that
the presence of a school policy or other objective factors may
reduce or nullify an otherwise legitimate expectation of privacy; (2)
whether the character of the intrusion is minimal or significant; and
(3) whether the nature and immediacy of the governmental interest
at stake is significant and whether the efficacy of the means
employed is apparent. Courts must analyze administrative searches
according to this test; the TL.O. test should only be used for
individualized suspicion searches.'51
Id. at 662-63 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Id. at 663. "It seems to us self-evident that a drug problem largely fueled by the
'role model' effect of athletes' drug use, and of particular danger to athletes, is effectively
addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs." Id. Following this logic, general
searches could be justified against so-called Goths, members of a school's "trench-coat
posse," or against other gang like groups. It seems this would stretch Acton to a level not yet
contemplated, but one which seems tenable. There is a risk that school officials will use the
policy to test in an arbitrary manner against troublemakers, even though possession of illegal
items or substances is not likely. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 664.
150. Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65. Justice O'Connor delivered a stinging dissent, criticizing
general searches as the very evil that the Fourth Amendment is designed to combat, and as
per se unreasonable. Id. at 667-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor terms blanket
searches as utterly unreasonable and that such unreasonableness is well grounded in history.
Id. at 669 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). A "misery loves company" theory, that is a search
becomes reasonable if it is extended to encompass everybody or a significant number of
persons or groups, does not comport with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 670 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Evenhandedness will not supply reasonableness. Id. at 671-73 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
151. See In re FB., 658 A 2d 1378, 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). This case tried to stretch
the TL.O. test to analyze a uniform search for weapons. A court can correctly cite to TL.O.
for the proposition that school searches must be measured under a standard of
reasonableness, which takes into account the balancing act between the interest in
maintaining school security, discipline and the student's interest in privacy. New Jersey v.
T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 337-41 (1985). A court should not cite to the TL.O. two-prong test in the
2000 School Violence: An Incurable Social Ill
One of the most significant state decisions involving
administrative searches came from the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Cass.152 Cass involved a massive drug
search of 2,000 student lockers by canine units.t, The school was
confronted with a considerable amount of drug use and sales
within the school.M The court correctly followed and applied Acton
to the mass search of student lockers. 55 Applying the Acton
framework, the court determined that the students' privacy interest
in school lockers was significantly reduced given the presence of a
school policy.'5 Next, the court determined that the canine sniff
was not a search under the United States Constitution, and that
searching the inside of the lockers was minimally intrusive given
the limited expectation of privacy attributed to those lockers.
157
context of an administrative search, because that test is a test for reasonable suspicion. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court corrected this problem on appeal. In the Interest'of F.B., 726
A.2d 361 (Pa. 1999). In addition, a learned analysis by Judge Hudock in Commonwealth v.
JB., 719 A.2d 1058 (Pa Super. Ct. 1998), noted that administrative searches and
individualized searches must be analyzed under different standards. See also People v. Pruitt,
662 N.E.2d 540, 547 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (applying TL.O. test to metal detector search of
students entering a school).
152. 709 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1998).
153. Cass, 709 A.2d at 352. The search was announced before it was conducted. Id.
Two police officers with a trained dog conducted a sniff search of the lockers. Id. When a
dog was alerted to the presence of drugs, the school officials and police would search the
locker and adjacent lockers. Id. Cass' locker revealed marijuana and paraphernalia. Id. Cass
was suspended and charged criminally for possession of drugs. Id.
154. Id. The court noted the following indicia of school-wide drug abuse:
information received from unnamed students; observations from teachers of
suspicious activity by the students, such as passing small packages between
themselves in the hallways; increased use of the student assistance program for
counseling students with drug problems; calls from concerned parents; observation of
a growing number of students carrying beepers; students in possession of large
amounts of money; and increased use of pay phones by students.
Id. The trial court determined that these facts did not justify a massive search without an
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. Id. at 353.
155. Id. at 355-58.
156. Id. at 356-57. In addition, the court considered the fact that the lockers were
school property, that the students were required to file locker combinations with school
officials, that school officials possess a master key to lockers, and that school officials are
frequently in school lockers making repairs without giving notice. Id. at 357.
157. Cass, 709 A.2d at 357. In the court's discussion of the third prong of the Acton
test, the court made a reference to the element of reasonable expectations. Id. This is
arguably incorrect as that element was already considered in the first prong of the balancing
test, and perhaps should not be considered again to minimize the intrusion in the third
prong. The second part of the Acton test should be analyzed on a rational continuum with
the search of a person's most intimate areas and body cavity searches as the most intrusive
searches possible. Search of school lockers and items contained therein is somewhat
intrusive, albeit not as intrusive as a search of one's person or a search of items possessed
on one's person. See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992) (finding
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Finally, the court found that the nature and immediacy element of
the Acton test was satisfied given the heightened awareness of drug
activity in the school and the generally compelling interest of
eliminating drug use in schools.158 The court also agreed that the
means employed were effectively tied to this purpose.t Therefore,
the search satisfied the Fourth Amendment requirement of
reasonableness. 160
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then examined the lawfulness
of the search under Article I, Section Eight of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 161 The court emphasized that the United States
Constitution merely sets the minimal search requirements; even so,
the court determined that state law did not require a different
result from the federal analysis.162 The Cass decision stands as a
expectation of privacy more significant in some areas than others).
158. Cass, 709 A.2d at 357.
159. Id. at 357-58. Specifically, the court found this type of search allowed the school
officials to discover evidence of drug use in the school, acted to deter future drug use, and
allowed the school to effectively control drug use as a school-wide problem. Id. at 358. The
means employed were seemingly the least intrusive method to conduct such a school-wide
search. Id.
160. Id. at 358.
161. Id. Section Eight of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads,
[T]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
PA. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
Two other courts have dealt with this issue. See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363
(Mass. 1992) (examining the effect of an individualized search in light of Article Fourteen of
the Massachusetts' Declaration of Rights); In re S.C., 583 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 1991) (analyzing
under Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution). See also Commonwealth v. J.B.,
719 A.2d 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (examining under both the United States and
Pennsylvania constitutions a search conducted after a school police officer noticed a
student's eyes were closed, speech was slurred, and body was staggering).
162. Cass, 709 A.2d at 358. The minimum requirements of a search are stated in New
Jersey v. TL.O. Id. Therefore, it is entirely conceivable that some state courts will determine
that a school search requires probable cause, not just reasonable suspicion, under individual
state constitutions. Courts should conduct independent state constitutional analyses where
appropriate; school officials should be aware of trends in state jurisprudence with search
and seizure. However, the majority in Cass concluded that Pennsylvania did not offer any
additional constitutional grounds than those offered under the Federal Constitution. Id. at
365. In doing so, they applied the test of Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa.
1991), for assessing independent state constitutional challenges. Cass, 709 A.2d at 358. The
test requires a four-part inquiry into: "(1) [t]he text of the Pennsylvania constitutional
provision; (2) [the] history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case-law; (3) related
case-law from other states; [and] (4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state
and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence." Id. (quoting
Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895). The court determined that Article I, Section Eight of the
Pennsylvania Constitution was textually similar to the United States Fourth Amendment. Id.
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landmark state appellate decision and indicates a well-established
pattern of excellent jurisprudence by Pennsylvania courts in
administrative search cases.'1
In State v. J.A., a Florida school district enacted a policy to
conduct random searches for weapons with handheld metal
detectors.1 Applying Acton's balancing test, the court determined
that this random search served the dual purposes of discovering
weapons and deterring their use.165 Another well-reasoned decision
is People v. Dukes. Pursuant to school guidelines, a metal
detector search was conducted of the general student body. 67 After
Dukes was subjected to a metal detector search, a switchblade was
discovered.' 6 The court applied a two-prong balancing test to find
that the school interest involved outweighed the minimal
The court recognized the particularly strong interest in privacy, which has been recognized
in Pennsylvania case law, but found that a student's expectation in privacy is more limited
than citizens in general. Id. at 359-60. The court applied a Pennsylvania balancing test of the
objective of the search and the intrusion involved, and found that the government interest in
a drug-free school environment was compelling, and outweighed the minimal intrusion
involved in a search of lockers subject to prior warning. Id. at 360-62. The court next found
that other jurisdictions have almost unanimously adopted the framework announced in
TL.O., even though no jurisdiction has yet to adopt the relevant decision in Acton. Id. at
362-64. However, the court concluded that Acton would likewise be unanimously adopted for
individual state constitutional inquiries. Id. at 364. Finally, the court decided that policy
considerations actually weighed in favor of protecting the innocence of the school
environment, rather than the limited rights afforded to school students. Id. at 364-65.
163. See also In re FB., 726 A.2d 361 (Pa. 1999), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 613 (1999); In
re S.S., 680 A-2d 1172 (Pa Super. Ct. 1996) (upholding under the United States and
Pennsylvania constitutions a metal detector search of student and a pat-down search of
belongings during a student-wide search).
164. 679 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), review denied, 689 So. 2d 1069 (Fla.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 98 (1997). The policy came on the heels of an increase in
school violence nationwide. Id. at 318. Under the policy, an independent security firm
randomly selected J.A.'s classroom for search. Id. A firearm was discovered in J.A.'s jacket.
Id.
165. Id. at 320. The court correctly pointed out that a magnetometer located at
entrances would not have been as effective as the hand held detectors because the school
was designed architecturally as an open campus. Id.
166. 580 N.YS.2d 850 (N.Y Crim. Ct. 1992). In Dukes, police officers set up metal
detector scanning posts after signs were posted announcing the search. Id. at 850. The
search was conducted with the use of hand-held devices. Id. at 851. It should be noted that
Dukes was decided before Acton, but in any event the decision in Dukes was rational and in
line with Acton.
167. Id. at 850. The procedure required all students entering the school to be scanned.
Id. at 851. If a student's belongings triggered the detector, the student was asked to open the
item for a search. Id. If the student's body triggered the detector, the officer would ask the
student to remove all metal objects. Id. A second scan was then conducted. Id. If activated
again, the request was repeated, followed by a pat-down search. Id.
168. Id. at 851.
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intrusiveness of the search. 169
An issue of merit concerning administrative searches, especially
in light of the rash of recent school shootings, is the viability of
such searches in schools that have no history of violence,
disciplinary problems, or weapons. The third prong of Acton would
seemingly not be satisfied, because the search would be far more
intrusive than the relatively nonexistent governmental interest. In
the wake of these school shootings, schools that have not enacted
security measures inevitably will do so, even in the absence of a
prior history of violence with their students. Defendants should
point out the absence of violence in such cases, given the above
anomaly in Acton. To solve this issue, courts could arguably take
judicial notice of the widespread existence of firearm violence on
school campuses, as was previously done with airports and
courthouses. 
170
To summarize, the necessary factors which will lead to judicial
approval of an administrative search are: (1) a written school
policy that is consistently followed; (2) a search conducted by
school officials or police who act only on school authority; (3) a
history or recent resurgence of violence in the school that
necessitates immediate action by the school; (4) signs or other
forms of notice prior to the search; (5) procedures allowing
students the opportunity to give up metal objects before search;
and (6) searches that are not extensive and do not involve body
cavity or strip searches.17 The metal detector system is probably
the most effective and legally sound method. However, installation,
169. Id. at 852-53. However, the trial court raised an interesting issue: students are
required to attend school and have no choice to decline to go through the detectors upon
entering the school. Id. at 853. This differs considerably from courthouses and airports
where individuals can simply choose not to enter. Id. at 852. The trial court responded,
The issue of consent is less crucial, however, in evaluating the overall intrusiveness of
the school search. After all, children are required by law to attend school. To allow
students to walk away upon activating a scanning device would only encourage
truancy . . . [g]iven the unique nature of the school setting . . . the guidelines are
minimally intrusive despite the absence of a consent provision.
Id. at 853. Accord People v. Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d 540 (ill. App. Ct. 1996). See In re F.B., 726 A-2d
361, 373 (Pa. 1999) (Zappala, J., dissenting) (distinguishing administrative searches in other
contexts because school students are required by law to attend school).
170. See Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d at 545 (citing United States v. Cyzenski, 484 F.2d 509 (5th
Cir. 1973)).
171. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 37-6.1 (West Supp. 1999) (prohibiting body cavity or strip
searches under any circumstances). This policy is grounded in logic given that school
officials are 11-trained for such searches, and the fact that these searches are exceedingly
intrusive. For these same reasons, pat-down searches, albeit less intrusive, should not be
used by school officials.
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administration, and maintenance of detectors can be very
expensive, time-consuming, annoying, and not conducive to a
positive school image. Randomly administered searches with
handheld detectors are a feasible alternative. 1 2  Evidentiary
searches should be considered unconstitutional when performed as
administrative searches regardless of the spin that some courts may
place on the issue.173
II. SOCIAL AND MORAL MEASURES
Essentially, this section could be titled "the blame game." In the
wake of the Columbine massacre, a coalition of political forces
have combined to produce a series of proposals to solve the school
violence issue. What follows is a sample of some of the proposed
laws and "solutions."
Following the Columbine and Conyers shootings, Congress
proposed one of the first anti-gun bills since the Brady Gun Law.174
The proposal would make it illegal for gun shows to sell guns
without background checks. 75 Lawmakers should examine in great
detail the facts of the various school shootings: in Moses Lake,
Washington, the student used a .30-.30 caliber rifle; in Pearl,
Mississippi, the student used a .30-.30 caliber rifle; in Springfield,
Oregon, the student used a .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle and two
pistols; in West Paducah, Kentucky, the student used a .22 caliber
Ruger pistol; in Conyers, Georgia, the student used a .22 caliber
rifle. 76 In general, these weapons were of the most popular kind;
the .22 and .30-.30 caliber rifles used in these various shootings will
be least affected by restrictive gun laws. Furthermore, background
172. See State v. J.A_, 679 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding multiple
entrances to building would not allow effective general metal detector search, hand-held
detectors were more feasible).
173. See e.g. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). As recognized in
Acton, the rationale behind the allowance of administrative searches in the school
environment is the recognition that school officials must maintain order and discipline in
their schools. Id. at 685 (citing TL.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)). An interest designed purely for
evidentiary purposes would indicate that the school officials had a minimum interest at best
in maintaining school order and discipline, but were primarily concerned with supplying the
police with items of evidence. Police officers could not otherwise conduct such a search
without the assistance of a school official.
174. H.R. 902, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 443, 106th Cong. (1999).
175. Id. See DEP'T OF JUSTIE & DEP'T OF TREASURY, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S LAW
ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY: FIGHTING GUN VIOLENCE AND KEEPING GUNS AWAY FROM CRIMINALS AND
OUR CHILDREN (May 1999).
176. John Cloud, Special Report: Troubled Kids: Just a Routine Shooting, TIME, May
31, 1999, at 34.
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checks accomplish little to nothing in terms of keeping guns out of
the hands of school shooters. The facts of the school shootings
demonstrate that the guns were acquired or stolen from adults or
parents who can easily and legally pass those- background
checks. 7 7 In any event, gun control is a long-term solution, and in
the end will probably do little to prevent teens from murdering
their fellow classmates through some other form of destruction.
Gun control merely presents a distraction from legislation sound in
logic and effective in application.
Along the same lines, the Pennsylvania Senate has proposed a
bill to outlaw violent video games. 178 The Senator who proposed the
bill stated, "Our children need our protection. Studies have shown
that young children who engage in violent interactive video games
are less likely to perform well in the classroom ... their aptitude
for academics declines and their ability to develop intellectually is
stunted."'179 While some video games are undeniably inappropriate
for young children, desensitization has progressed to a point that
the elimination of video games would 'only affect a very minute
fraction of violent images which students are exposed to each and
every day. In any event, the bill cannot deal with the present school
violence problem and can only produce long-term results.
There is a much more interesting solution proposed by the state
legislature in Louisiana.'8° The legislation requires that school
students in all Louisiana schools stand when a teacher or
administrator enters into -a classroom, and also requires that
students address teachers or administrators as Sir, Ma'am, Mr.,
Mrs., or Ms.' 8' The Louisiana legislature should be applauded for
attempting to reintroduce an element of respect back into the
school systems; however, this law does little to prevent school
177. Id. For example, Barry Loukaitis from Moses Lake, Washington, acquired his
weapon from home, as did Luke Woodham in Pearl, Mississippi, Thomas Solomon in
Conyers, Georgia, Andrew Golden and Mitchell Johnson in Jonesboro, Arkansas, and Kipland
Kinkel in Springfield, Oregon. Id. Michael Carneal stole his firearm from a neighbor in West
Paducah, Kentucky. Id. Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold got their guns from friends who
purchased the weapons. Id.
178. S. 960, 183d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999). See also Oversight Hearing to Examine
Youth Culture and Violence Before the House Judiciary Committee, 106th Cong. (testimony
of Dewey G. Cornell, Ph.D) (pointing to these video games as a source of violent behavior in
school-age children).
179. Wagner Opposes Violent Video Games for Minors, 42ND DIsTRICT NEwsL. (State
Senator Jack Wagner), Summer 1999, at 1.
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shootings. It will be interesting to see whether the Louisiana law
will pass constitutional muster under the First Amendment. This
law, like many social and moral measures, may come into conflict
with the First Amendment, especially for those "pre-ordained" to be
the next school shooters, i.e., the so-called Goths, the members of
the trench coat posse, etc. 82
A. First Amendment Issues
Society has traditionally recognized the curtailment of students'
First Amendment rights. The courts, on the other hand, have
protected the freedom of speech in schools.'8 The applicable law
in this area is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District.18 In Tinker, several students planned to wear
armbands to school in opposition of the Vietnam War.'15 The school
learned of this plan and enacted a policy prohibiting students from
wearing armbands to school. 86 Several students violated the policy
and were suspended. 18
7
The Supreme Court recognized that the wearing of armbands is a
form of "pure speech" entitled to comprehensive protection under
the First Amendment.'88 However, the Court also recognized that
school officials have a considerable interest in maintaining order
and discipline in the schools that may justify an intrusion upon the
constitutional rights of students. 89 The Court determined that
wearing armbands would not cause the type of disturbance that
would justify such an intrusion upon the First Amendment rights of
182. See Dana Hawkin, Schools; News You Can Use; Student Rights; When Cookies and
Hair Dye Cause Alarm, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, May 31, 1999 at 72 (describing Goths
as those wearing dark nail polish, heavy chains, and combat boots).
183. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling
prior legislative and judicially-approved attempts to force students to salute the United States
flag).
184. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
185. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
186. Id.
187. Id. The students commenced suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages and an
injunction. Id. The district court dismissed the suit on the grounds that the policy was
necessary in order to maintain order. Id. at 504-05. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed; the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 505.
188. Id. at 505-06. The Court noted, "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506.
189. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. "Our problem lies in the area where students in the
exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities." Id.
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students.19° The Court found that the suspensions could not be
justified on the basis that "[s]chool authorities simply felt that 'the
schools are no place for demonstrations.'"1 91 The Court developed
the following test:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to
justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it
must be able to show that its action was caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no showing
that engaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school," the prohibition
cannot be sustained. 192
The problem with Tinker is that it may be outdated, because it is
a 1969 decision and more than fifteen years older than TL.O.193 A
more recent decision has cast some doubt on Tinker's viability. In
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, Fraser delivered a speech
filled with sexual innuendo during a high school assembly for. the
election of student officers. 94 The school officials determined that
190. Id. at 508. The wearing of armbands was a silent, passive expression of opinion
that did not interfere with the school's daily routine nor lead to aggressive or disruptive
action. Id. No threats were made on school premises from hostile students. Id.
191. Id. at 509 n.3. The school officials singled out armbands for prohibition. Id. at 510.
192. Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)):
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the
conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without "materially and substantially interfer[ing]
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" and
without colliding with the rights of others.... But conduct by the student, in class or
out of it, which for any reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of




194. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). The speech, in relevant part, is as follows:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character
is firm-but most . . .of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard,
pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.... Jeff is a man who will go to the
very end-even the climax, for each and every one of you.... So vote for Jeff for
A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the best our high school can
be.
Id. at 687.
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the speech substantially interfered with the educational process,
suspended Fraser for three days, and removed his name from the
list of candidates for graduation speaker.195 Fraser filed suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.196 The Court upheld the sanctions imposed by the
school district as proper and permissible under the First
Amendment.'97 In its decision, the Court distinguished Tinker
because that case "did 'not concern speech or action that intrudes
upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students.'"'98
First Amendment rights may be ripe for discussion in front of the
Supreme Court given the inevitable prospect that those rights will
suffer disproportionately to other constitutionally protected rights
in schools. Targets will include students who wear trench coats,
students who are fascinated with weapons or destruction, as well
as student Internet web-sites promoting destruction and violence.
This assumption is based on the media's characterization of the
students who committed these heinous acts as loners, deviants, and
as those accustomed to using the most perverse forms of
expression available in our society.1' The First Amendment will be
the most seriously tested of the constitutional rights possessed by
students because, out of the rights given to Americans by the
Constitution, school officials, parents, and other adults are the least
willing to recognize student rights of free speech and expression.
195. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678. Before the speech, Fraser was told not to deliver his
planned speech containing sexual innuendo. Id. Many of the students were observed in a
state of unruliness or total embarrassment during the speech. Id. Bethel High School also
had a policy: "[c]onduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational
process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Id.
196. Id. at 679. The district court held that the school policy was vague and overbroad
and therefore violated Fraser's First Amendment rights. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
holding that the speech was indistinguishable from that in Tinker. Id. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 680.
197. Id: at 685. The Court noted,
The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly
is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.... The schools, as instruments
of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot
be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and
conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy.
Id. at 683.
198. Id. at 680 (quoting Tinker, 478 U.S. at 508). "The undoubted freedom to advocate
unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the
society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior." Id. at 681. In balancing these interests, "[e]ven the most heated political discourse
in a democratic society requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other
participants and audiences." Id. at 681.
199. See John Cloud, Special Report: Troubled Kids: Just a Routine Shooting, TIME,
May 31, 1999, at 34.
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Measures of a social or moral origin present many complications,
because they infringe upon established student rights and they
draw attention away from the key issues at hand. However, by
looking at the situation over the long-term, social and moral
measures may be the only solution. Only when all students are
persuaded that killing their fellow students is not socially
acceptable will the school shootings come to an end.
III. DETERRENCE
This brings us to measures designed to deter students, and
adults, from possessing weapons on school grounds, by imposing
various forms of punishment ranging from actual criminal
proceedings to suspension or expulsion. Statutes, some of which
are very unforgiving, have been passed in many states to
specifically deal with the possession of weapons on school
grounds. These statutes may generally deter students from bringing
weapons to school, but they will not deter students who have
detailed plans of killing other students and themselves.
A. School Zone and Other Related Laws
The federal government attempted to combat firearm possession
on school grounds by passing the Gun Free School Zones Act in
1994.200 The Act provided:
It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate
or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone..... It shall
be unlawful for any person, knowingly or with reckless
disregard for the safety of another, to discharge or attempt to
discharge a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise
affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the
person knows is a school zone.
20 1
Congress attempted to pass the statute pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, but the United States Supreme Court did not
accept this logic and declared the act unconstitutional in United
States v. Lopez. 02 The Act represented a failed attempt by the
200. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. 1996).
201. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(2)(A) (Supp. 1996); 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(3)(A) (Supp. 1996)
202. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Congress cited the following findings in its preamble in order
to satisfy the Commerce Clause, United States Constitution Article I, Section 8, requirements:
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federal government to interject itself into the problem of weapons
possession on school premises. Declaring the statute
unconstitutional is not as important as the striking precedent it
established for future federal attempts to create a nationwide act to
prevent school shootings. The federal government will be hesitant
to pass future laws dealing with firearms on school property.
20 3
State statutes generally track the same language as the failed
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1994.204 Pennsylvania's statute is a
typical example:
(a) Definiion.-Notwithstanding the definition of "weapon" in
section 907 (relating to possessing instruments of crime),
"weapon" for purposes of this section shall include but not be
limited to any knife, cutting instrument, cutting tool, nunchuck
stick, firearm, shotgun, rifle and any other tool, instrument or
that-(F) the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a decline in
the quality of education in our country; (G.) this decline in the quality of education
has an adverse impact on interstate commerce and the foreign commerce of the
United States; (H.) States, localities, and school systems find it almost impossible to
handle gun-related crime by themselves-even States, localities, and school systems
that have made strong efforts to prevent, detect, and punish gun-related crime find
their efforts unavailing due in part to the failure or inability of other States or
localities to take strong measures; and (I.) the Congress has the power, under the
interstate commerce clause and other provisions of the Constitution, to enact
measures to ensure the integrity and safety of the Nation's schools by enactment of
this subsection.
18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1) (Supp. 1996).
203. But see Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 2K2.5 (providing a sentence
enhancement for offenses where the defendant possessed or discharged a weapon on school
premises). Otherwise, the notoriety of Lopez will likely preclude any attempt to reexamine
its principles any time in the near future.
204. See ALA. CODE § 13a-11-72 (1994); ARK CODE ANN. § 5-73-119 (Michie Supp. 1999);
CAL PENAL CODE § 626.9 (West 1999); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-12-105.5 (1999); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-217b (West 1999); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1457 (1995); FLA STAT. ANN. § 790.115
(West Supp. 1999); GA CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 18-3302D (1997); 720 ILL
Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1 (c) (West Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.4B (West Supp. 1999);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.95 (West Supp. 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20a § 6552 (West 1993);
MD. CODE ANN., CIS. & JUD. Poc. ART. 27, § 36A (1997); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 269, § 10
(West Supp. 1999); MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 28.277 (West Supp. 1999); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §
609.66 (West Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-17 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.030 (West
Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-361 (1999); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1204.04 (1995); NEv. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 202.265 (Michie 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c: 39-5 (e) (West Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-7-2.1 (Michie 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 265.01 (3), 265.06, 265.20 (3) (McKinney
Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 (Supp. 1998); OKiA STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1280.1 (West
Supp. 2000); OR. REv. STAT. § 166.370 (1990); 18 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 912 (West 1998); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 11-47-60 (Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-7 (Michie Supp. 1999); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-1309 (1997); TEx PENAL CODE § 46.03 (West Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-10-505.5 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (Michie Supp. 1999); W. VA- CODE § 61-7-11a
(1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 948.605, 948.61 (West 1996).
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implement capable of inflicting serious bodily injury.
(b) Offense defimed.-A person commits a misdemeanor of the
first degree if he possesses a weapon in the buildings of, on
the grounds of, or in any conveyance providing transportation
to or from any elementary or secondary publicly-funded
educational institution, any elementary or secondary private
school licensed by the Department of Education or any
elementary or secondary parochial school.
(c) Defense.-It shall be a defense that the weapon is
possessed and used in conjunction with a lawful supervised
school activity or course or is possessed for other lawful
purpose.
205
In the wake of the school shootings, we can predict that states
will inevitably attempt to strengthen their existing laws targeting
possession. A problem presented here concerns the breadth of
these laws, which might punish individuals who have no intent of
committing criminal acts on school grounds and may not even
know they are in possession of a weapon or that they are on
school grounds. At the same time, these laws will fail to prevent
children, like Golden and Johnson in Jonesboro and Klebold and
Harris in Littleton, from carrying out isolated student massacres.
The primary targets of these statutes are students who are already
known to bring, or are suspected of bringing, weapons to school.
As such, the statutes are inadequate in dealing with random acts of
violence or isolated mass killings.
Many statutes are not limited to firearms, but also include deadly
or dangerous weapons or simply weapons. 20 6 The latter category
raises questions regarding arbitrary or unreasonable enforcement
because much will depend on what school officials consider
weapons. Students found with small pocketknives could
conceivably be expelled or charged with a crime. 0 7 Furthermore,
the majority of states treat possession or discharge as a felony.208 In
205. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 912 (West 1998). A majority of the state statutes dealing
with possession on school grounds do not require an element of scienter, and possessors are
punished even if they do not know they are in possession of a firearm or weapon, or that
they are in a school zone. See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-119 (Michie Supp. 1999); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.66 (1)(d) (West Supp. 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-37-17 (1999).
206. See, e.g., 720 ILL Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1 (c) (West Supp. 1999) (banning firearms
and other weapons); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-105.5 (1999) (prohibiting deadly weapons);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-217b (West Supp. 1999) (targeting weapons); DEL CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 1457 (1995) (prohibiting weapons).
207. See 18 PA CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 912 (a) (West 1998) (defining weapon as any knife).
208. See, e.g., ALA CODE § 13a-11-72 (1994); GA CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1 (1999); W. VA
Vol. 38:617
School Violence: An Incurable Social Ill
general, the statutes provide for a fine of not more than five
thousand dollars and imprisonment for a maximum of two to five
years.2°9 These penalties can be stringent but do little to deter the
school tragedies discussed. Legislators faced with calls for a
solution look to these types of basic laws but, unfortunately, have
failed to develop statutes which effectively deter school shootings.
Another area of deterrence deals with mandatory expulsion or
suspension for possession of weapons. 210 These statutes call for a
mandatory one-year suspension for school students possessing a
weapon.2 ' Federal incentives call for mandatory expulsion for
students possessing a weapon, regardless of whether scienter is
present.2 12 This poses unique problems in the school environment,
because students can easily frame other students, severely affecting
the other's educational opportunity. For example, the Mississippi
expulsion statute:
Any student in any school who possesses . . . a knife,
handgun, other firearm or any other instrument considered to
be dangerous and capable of causing bodily harm or who
commits a violent act on educational property as defined in
section 97-37-17 .. . shall be subject to automatic expulsion
for a calendar year by the superintendent or principal of the
CODE § 61-7-11a (1997).
209. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.66 (1)(d) (West Supp. 1999) (calling for fine of not
more than five thousand dollars); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-37-17 (1999) (allowing up to 3 years
imprisonment).
210. See ALA- CODE § 16-1-24.3 (1999); CAL, EDUC. CODE tit. X, § 48915 (West Supp. 1999);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-233d (West Supp. 1999); DEL CODE ANN. § 11-1457 (j)(4) (1995);
RAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A-1134, 302A-1134.5 (Michie Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 18-3302D
(1997); 105 ILL Comep. STAT. ANN. § 5/10-22.6 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-89a02 (Supp.
1998); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.150 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1998); LA REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:416
(West Supp. 1999); ME. REX. STAT. ANN. tit. 20A, § 1001 (West Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN.
EDUC. § 7-305 (Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 71, § 37H (West 1996); MICH. COMe.
LAws ANN. § 15.41311 (West 1996); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.44 (West Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 37-11-18 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 160.261-3 (West Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §
20-5-202 (1999); N.H- REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.13 (Supp. 1999); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 18A- 37-2.1, 2.2,
2.3, 2.4, 7, 8 (West Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.7 (Michie 1995); N.Y. EDUC. LAw §
3214 (McKinney 1995/Supp. 1999); OKL_ STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-101.3 (West Supp. 2000); 24
PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1317.2 (Supp. 1999); R.I GEN. LAws § 16-21-18 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 59-63-235 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3401 (Supp. 1999); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, § 11.66 (b)(2) (Supp. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 28A.600.420 (West Supp.
1999); W. VA CODE § 18A-5-19 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 120.13 (bin) (West Supp. 1998); WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4-306 (LEXIS, formerly Michie 1999).
211. See 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (1994) (withholding federal funding to states unless they





school in which the student is enrolled; provided, however,
that the superintendent of the school shall be authorized to
modify the period of time for such expulsion on a case by
case basis. Such expulsion shall take effect immediately
subject to the constitutional rights of due process, which shall
include the student's right to appeal to the local school
board.
213
Following the above example, even if a full hearing is given, all
that must be proven is that the student had a weapon in his
possession.214 Any defense to the effect that the weapon was not
his or hers, or that the weapon was planted, is irrelevant.215 Again,
this statute's deterrence value is limited because most school
shooters are first time criminals. In addition, innocent or less
threatening students could be adversely affected by such statutes.
Other provisions of interest are those that punish third parties
for failing to keep their weapons out of the hands of minors, called
"child access prevention" (CAP) statutes.21 6 Florida requires gun
dealers to provide purchasers with written warnings, stating that it
is unlawful to store or leave a firearm where a minor has easy
access.217 Florida punishes the failure to store weapons safely as a
misdemeanor of the second degree.21 8 In addition, Florida punishes
those who sell firearms to minors as committing a felony in the
213. MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-18 (1999).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OF TREASURY, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S LAw
ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY: FIGHTING GUN VIOLENCE AND KEEPING GUNS AWAY FROM CRIMINALS AND
OUR CHILDREN (May 1999). See also H.R. 1342, 106th Cong. (1999).
217. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.175 (West Supp. 1999).
218. See FIA STAT. ANN. § 790.174 (West Supp. 1999). The statute reads:
(1) a person who stores or leaves, on a premise under his or her control, a loaded
firearm,... and who knows or reasonably should know that a minor is likely to gain
access to th6 firearm without the lawful permission of the minor's parent or the
person having charge of the minor, or without the supervision required by law, shall
keep the firearm in a securely locked box or container or in a location which a
reasonable person would believe to be secure or shall secure it with a trigger lock,
except when the person is carrying the firearm on his or her body or within such
close proximity thereto that he or she can retrieve and use it as easily and quickly as
if he or she carried it on his or her body. (2) it is a misdemeanor of the second
degree.... if a person violates subsection (1) by failing to store or leave a firearm in
the required manner and as a result thereof a minor gains access to the firearm,
without the lawful permission of the minor's parent or the person having charge of
the minor, and possesses or exhibits it, without the supervision required by law: (a) in
a public place; or (b) in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner . . . This
subsection does not apply if the minor obtains the firearm as a result of an unlawful
entry by any person.
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third degree.2 19
In comparison to Florida's stringent third party firearm laws,
Oklahoma punishes parents of students who possess firearms on
school premises with a fine not to exceed two hundred dollars or
forty hours of community service.220 A similar Tennessee provision
is much tougher, in that it calls for a Class A misdemeanor offense
if a parent, legal guardian, or any other adult knows that a minor
or student is in possession of a firearm on school grounds and fails
to prevent or report the possession.22' Tennessee may have gone
too far in imposing such a duty on all adults, rather than just
parents and guardians who have a long history of legal
responsibility for their charges. Nevertheless, if faced with criminal
sanctions for the acts of students, third parties will likely be highly
cognizant of the whereabouts of their weapons. Furthermore, these
statutes appear sensible. Third parties and parents should be
targeted for willful neglect of their weapons and their children
where their neglect leads to these tragedies. Legislatures should be
careful, however, not to impose penalties unless there is at least
evidence of criminal negligence. The ownership of a firearm should
not carry with it strict liability for any situation that occurs. Florida
adequately deals with this situation by excepting situations where
the weapons are stolen or have been taken from areas which are
reasonably believed to be secured.
222
B. Procedural Due Process
Once weapons are discovered, school policies or state laws
generally mandate suspension or expulsion, as discussed above.
223
These suspensions and expulsions raise due process challenges,
because school students may be denied proper hearings or the
ability to present a defense. The United States Supreme Court's
decision in Goss v. Lopez governs the area of procedural due
process.
224
It is undeniable that children are entitled to free public
education, and that to strip this interest away without due process
would be a violation of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.2 25 In
219. See LA STAT. ANN. § 790.17 (West Supp. 1999).
220. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 858 (West Supp. 2000).
221. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1312 (Supp. 1999).
222. FLA STAT. ANN. § 790.174 (West Supp. 1999).
223. See supra note 210 for citations to such statues.
224. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
225. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 572-73. Justice White noted, "The Fourteenth Amendment
2000
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Goss, Ohio provided free education to all children between ages
five and twenty-one.226 Ohio also provided a procedure for the
suspension or expulsion of students for misconduct.22 The problem
in Goss arose out of the absence of notice or a hearing for school
students facing suspension, where, in contrast, hearings were
provided for students facing expulsion.2 8 No hearing was given
prior to or after the suspensions. 29 The students in Goss who were
suspended from school without a hearing sued under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.230
The Supreme Court decided that "having chosen to extend the
right to an education to people of appellees' class generally, Ohio
may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct absent
fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the
misconduct has occurred."210 The Court examined the liberty
interests at stake, including the students' interest in maintaining
good standing for future educational and employment
opportunities, and determined that "the claimed right of the State
to determine unilaterally and without process whether that
forbids the State to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. Protected interests in property are normally not created by the Constitution [but] by an
independent source such as state statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits."
Id. On this basis the Court found that students clearly had a legitimate claim of entitlement
to public education. Id. at 573.
226. Id. at 573 (citing Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.64 (1972 & Supp. 1973)).
227. Id. at 573-74 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66). Under this law, school
administrators can suspend a student for up to 10 days. Id. Notification must be given to the
student's parents within 24 hours, along with reasons for the action taken. Id. Students who
are expelled have the right to appeal to the school board for a hearing on the issue of
reinstatement. Id. The Court noted on the authority of Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974), that section 3313.64 is not affected by section 3313.66 even though that section
provides for suspensions without warnings. Goss, 419 U.S. at 573-74.
228. Goss, 419 U.S. at 573-74.
229. Id. at 570. However, students and their parents were given the opportunity to
attend a conference after their suspensions. Id. Lopez claimed he played no role in the
destruction of the school lunchroom, for which seventy-five other students were suspended.
Id. He claimed that he should have been given a hearing to express this defense. Id. The
trial court agreed with the students' claims and noted that, except in emergency situations,
there were "minimum requirements of notice and a hearing prior to suspension." Id. at
571-72. The school board appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. at 572.
230. Id. at 568. The students also claimed that section 3313.66 was unconstitutional
because it denied a hearing for suspended students. Id. at 568-69. The students sought an
injunction to prevent school administrators from suspending students prospectively under
section 3313.66. Id. at 569. The students were involved in a series of disruptive behavior,
including a demonstration in the school auditorium and an assault upon a police officer. Id.
at 569-70.
231. Id. at 574. The Court conceded that Ohio is not obligated to provide free public
education. Id.
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misconduct has occurred immediately collides with the
requirements of the Constitution."2312 The school argued that even if
there is a right to public education, the school is only required to
provide due process where there are serious deprivations, which
did not include a ten-day suspension-1 However, the Court
properly shifted the focus from the weight of the interest at stake
to the nature of that interest, and concluded that a ten-day
suspension was not de minimis when one considers that "education
is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments."2" Suspensions, no matter how short, cannot be
imposed without complying with the constraints of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
235
Having determined that all school students have a due process
right, the Court next considered what type of process is required to
protect this right23 6 The Court held that, at a minimum, students
facing suspension should be given some form of notice and hearing
to alleviate the possibility of error237 The Court agreed that the
proper procedure must be ascertained from a balance of the
government interest in taking expedient disciplinary action and a
student's right to education by stating:
The difficulty is that our schools are vast and complex. Some
modicum of discipline and order is essential if the educational
function is to be performed. Events calling for discipline are
232. Id. at 575.
233. Goss, 419 U.S. at 575.
234. Id. at 575-76 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). The Goss
Court noted, "Appellees were excluded from school only temporarily, it is true, but the
length and consequent severity of a deprivation, while another factor to weigh in determining
the appropriate form of hearing, is not decisive of the basic right to a hearing of some kind."
419 U.S. at 576.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 577. "The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." Id. (quoting Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961)). The Court felt constrained by the special nature of
the school system, an area generally committed to the control of state and local
governments. Goss, 419 U.S. at 578.
237. Id. at 579-80. As the Court said:
The Due Process Clause will not shield [a student] from suspensions properly
imposed, but it disserves both [a student's] interest and the interest of the State if his
suspension is in fact unwarranted. The concern would be mostly academic if the
disciplinary process were a totally accurate, unerring process, never mistaken and
never unfair ... [but] the risk of error is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded




frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate,
effective action. Suspension is considered not only to be a
necessary tool to maintain order but a valuable educational
device. The prospect of imposing elaborate hearing
requirements in every suspension case is viewed with great
concern, and many school authorities may well prefer the
untrammeled power to act unilaterally, unhampered by rules
about notice and hearing. But it would be a strange
disciplinary system in an educational institution if no
communication was sought by the disciplinarian with the
student in an effort to inform him of his dereliction and to let
him tell his side of the story in order to make sure that an
injustice is not done. Fairness can rarely be obtained by
secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.
Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and
self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness.
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth
than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the
case against him and opportunity to meet it.238
The Court concluded that students facing temporary suspension
must receive oral or written notice of the charges against them,
and if the charges are denied, an explanation of the evidence and
an opportunity to be heard is warranted.239 The notice and hearing
can be informal and carried out at the same time.240 Generally, the
notice and hearing should occur before the suspension, although
the Court recognized that certain dangerous or disruptive situations
exist where the suspension may occur without notice or hearing.
241
In such situations, the notice and hearing should occur as soon as
practical.242 The Court pointed out two additional items: (1) the
decision does not contemplate a right for those with short
suspensions to secure counsel or to call or confront witnesses with
short suspensions; (2) the decision only applies to short
suspensions, longer suspensions may require formal notice and
hearing procedures.
24
238. Goss, 419 U.S. at 580. The students here were given no notice of what they were
accused of, nor an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 580 n.9.
239. Id. at 581.
240. Id. at 582-83.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Goss, 419 U.S. at 583-84. State statutes have picked up on this proposition, and
generally prescribe expulsion procedures by statute. See Tibbs v. Board of Educ. of Franklin
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Schools should be wary of infringing on due process, and should
attempt to head off section 1983 challenges to suspensions and
expulsions by enacting well-defined, stringent procedures.
Additionally, states should adopt statutory procedures to protect
against inadequate procedures employed by some school districts.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
An issue of primary concern for schools is liability. As state
actors, both schools and school officials are held to the standards
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.244 Liability will likely become a hot issue as
student liberties are sharply curtailed in response to recent school
shootings. Schools can expect to face meritless as well as viable
claims.245  However, schools may actually benefit from some
anomalies in section 1983, while teachers and individual
administrators may face personal liability.246
Municipal governments and governmental institutions are
governed by the standard announced in Monell v. Department of
Social Services.247 Under Monell, before liability attaches to a
municipality, an action must occur pursuant to an official municipal
policy that violates a constitutional right.248 This standard will
excuse schools from liability when school officials act in an
egregious manner, even though the schools employ those officials,
as long as they do not adopt general or "behind-the-scenes" policies
Township, 284 A.2d 179 (N.J. 1971) (holding that a student facing expulsion has the right to
discover witnesses for and against him or her, to take statements or affidavits from
witnesses against him or her, as well as to have those witnesses present at the hearing).
244. New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (school officials are state actors for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
245. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (successful challenge); Williams v.
Ellington, 936 F2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991) (unsuccessful claim).
246. But see L. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.3 (B), 416.4 (West Supp. 1998) (providing for
school district indemnification of teachers and administrators for damages incurred in
defense of suit for searches or seizures).
247. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
248. MoneU, 436 U.S. at 694.
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which are against the Constitution. 49 This may have a chilling
effect on school solutions to violence. Schools should not be
deterred from enacting policies if they are mindful of applicable
jurisprudence and thoughtfully incorporate that jurisprudence into
their policies. Schools may avoid liability when they have no
official policies violating the Constitution, however, school officials
will be forced to defend against liability for any acts that violate
the Constitution.
The determination of liability for school officials must be
evaluated in terms of the specific constitutional right violated.
Where a specific textual provision of the Constitution is applicable,
its governing standard must be applied.25° For example, in the
context of an unlawful search and seizure, the determination of
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 will be New Jersey v. TL.O. or
Vernonia School District v. Acton.
251
For the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 principles, Williams v.
Ellington is illustrative. 252  One student was subjected to a
warrantless strip search that produced no evidence of a criminal or
rule-breaking activity.25 After a search of Williams' locker, purse,
bag, and pockets, the principal ordered a strip search of Williams.
254
The court absolved the school district from liability under Monell.
255
The court then examined whether the strip search constituted a
violation of a "clearly established" right sufficiently clear as to put
a reasonable official on notice that he is violating another's
rights.25 Although other asserted rights may be an issue, a search
249. Id.
250. Graham v. O'Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
251. TL.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
252. 936 F2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991).
253. Williams, 936 F.2d at 882. A student reported that she saw Williams with a white
powdery substance, which was offered to the student. Id. The student affirmed that she had
no ill motive against Williams in informing the principal to this effect. Id. Williams' strange
behavior was confirmed by a teacher and her father. Id. "
254. Id. at 883. The search was conducted by a female assistant principal in front of a
female secretary. Id.
255. Id. at 884. However, the court noted there may be instances where an act
conducted pursuant to an otherwise constitutional policy is done in an unconstitutional
fashion. Id. The test is whether the municipality's conduct or policy is the "moving force"
behind the constitutional violation. Id. (citing Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1987)). In
this case the school board ratified the strip search of Williams after the fact. Id. at 884-85.
The court agreed that this would not supply the requisite moving force behind the alleged
violation because it represented only a single isolated policy decision. Id. A single episode
will not cause liability, but multiple episodes may. Id.
256. Id. at 885.
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and seizure will usually pass this hurdle, as it did in Williams.257
The court then applied the TL.O. standard and held that the
principal's actions were justified at their inception, and were of
permissible scope because it was reasonable to believe drugs were
being concealed.
5 8
Whereas state theories of liability are generally headed off by
qualified immunity, schools and school officials should be wary of
complainants in federal court. Yet, the standards applicable to 42
U.S.C § 1983 are so high that litigants will confront considerable
hurdles in proving their case.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it may be noted that the issue of school violence
is of great importance, but the legislatures of the 50 states and our
federal government will probably engage in a period of vacillation
before attempting to combat school shootings. The evident
frustrations encountered in molding legislative remedies have
already been discussed. State legislatures may act in an effort to
stave off an interested electorate, but these acts can only hope to
solve the problem. It is a false hope. School shootings are such an
isolated phenomenon that a solution can only come from the
students recognizing the moral implications of their conduct. Only
at the point when students are not willing to sacrifice their own
lives in order to carry out unbelievable destruction can we
successfully combat school shootings through legislation. School
districts can attempt to prevent the entry of weapons onto school
grounds with the use of metal detectors and other search methods.
School districts may be able to prevent the students who do not
have a death wish from entering the school premises with
weapons. But school districts cannot accomplish the same result
with a deranged student. Those students cannot be stopped. One
way or another a deranged student will either gain access to the
school, will assume a sniper position outside the school premises
like in Jonesboro, or will simply use their weapons at the metal
detector checkpoint.
Deranged students cannot conceptualize the gravity of killing or
the consequences that result thereafter. This is a basic fact that
257. Id. at 885-86 (relying on the analysis in Tinker and TL. 0.).
258. Williams, 936 E2d at 889. The Williams decision leaves much to be desired as far
as correctness, even though it represents a perfect example of a section 1983 application.
The decision is filled with analytical errors and misapplications of law.
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many school districts and state legislatures have apparently
overlooked. It is evident that school districts and legislatures lack
the resources to deal with this problem, as evidenced by its
continuation. In general, school districts have dealt with this matter
in 'an almost egotistical fashion. School districts announce that they
have ensured that their school will not be another Columbine.
Schools should not be so confident. Columbine would have
happened no matter how much security was in place, unless of
course the school were to take on the character of a prison with
armed guards. Take for example the Jonesboro duo, who effectively
skirted all security mechanisms in the school and murdered
students as they exited the building for a fire drill. Likewise, metal
detectors, clear plastic book bags, and heavy penalties for
possession can only accomplish one thing - a false sense of
security.
On the other side of the problem is the effect of legislation on
non-problematic students. School district and legislative "solutions"
impose upon these students unwanted and perhaps even
unnecessary constitutional infringements. These individuals will be
most affected with these measures. Not only are they the likely
targets of future school shootings, they will have to sacrifice a
considerable portion of their basic rights and liberties which have
developed under Tinker and TL.O. Just as more school shootings
can be expected, so too can students expect a decrease in the
range of their constitutional rights in the school. Inevitable
constitutional challenges will emerge and future Supreme Court
decisions can be expected. Is there a solution to the school
shootings epidemic and can an effective compromise be effectuated
to protect basic constitutional rights of students? Unfortunately, the
answer is probably not.
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